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Under Darwin’s Cosh?
Neo-Aristotelian Thinking in
Environmental Ethics
MICHAEL WHEELER
1. Standing on Darwin’s shoulders; or is that on his toes?
As a first shot, one might say that environmental ethics is concerned
distinctively with the moral relations that exist between, on the one
hand, human beings and, on the other, the non-human natural
environment. But this really is only a first shot. For example, one
might be inclined to think that at least some components of the
non-human natural environment (non-human animals, plants,
species, forests, rivers, ecosystems, or whatever) have independent
moral status, that is, are morally considerable in their own right,
rather than being of moral interest only to the extent that they
contribute to human well-being. If so, then one might be moved to
claim that ethical matters involving the environment are best cashed
out in terms of the dutes and responsibilities that human beings
have to such components. If, however, one is inclined to deny
independent moral status to the non-human natural environment or
to any of its components, then one might be moved to claim that the
ethical matters in question are exhaustively delineated by those
moral relations existing between individual human beings, or
between groups of human beings, in which the non-human natural
environment figures. One key task for the environmental ethicist is
to sort out which, if either, of these perspectives is the right one to
adopt—as a general position or within particular contexts. I guess I
don’t need to tell you that things get pretty complicated pretty
quickly. 
Some issues that energize environmental activists are essentially
local in scale. Examples might include the pollution of a river by
toxic waste or the building of a road through an area of natural
beauty. It seems fair to say, however, that environmental ethics has
become an important feature of the contemporary philosophical
landscape mostly as a reaction to various high-profile
environmental issues that confront humankind as a whole, issues
that engage environmental activists world wide. The list includes
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disasters (or potential disasters) such as global warming, excessive
deforestation, and the landslide extinction of large numbers of
animal and plant species. But while it may be true that the latter
class of issues has typically provided the real-world spur to
environmentally oriented philosophizing, the core questions that
more abstractly characterize the field of environmental ethics are
not themselves essentially crisis-driven. What are the normative
principles that regulate the ways in which human beings should
intervene in the non-human natural world? Which, if any, non-
human natural entities have independent moral status? Is it possible
to generate stable ethical principles of an environmentally sensitive
kind from a perspective on moral value which is purely
anthropocentric? These sorts of philosophical questions would be
worth asking even if the world were free from global environmental
challenges.1
As the title of this paper suggests, one of my present goals is to
say something of interest to thinkers engaged with environmental
ethics. I am, however, no ethicist—environmental or otherwise. The
arguments I shall develop are launched entirely from within the
intellectual borders of philosophy of biology. This might look like
a case of unprovoked philosophical imperialism—but it isn’t.
Indeed, at the risk of sounding petulant, they (some environmental
ethicists that is) started it, by (implicitly at least) making claims
about the fundamental character of biological systems. 
Here, then, is where we are going. I begin (section 2) by
describing how a prominent position in environmental ethics—Paul
Taylor’s biocentric individualism—is committed to a particular
explanation of the way in which the ethical norms that ought to
regulate environmental decision-making might be based on
biological facts. This explanation rests in turn on what is (I argue)
a recognizably Aristotelian style of thinking about the biological
realm. And that’s where, on the face of it, the trouble lies. For if the
received view of Darwinian theory and its place in evolutionary
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1 My description of environmental ethics has, of necessity, been very
brief. For recent book-length introductions to the field, see, for example:
R. Attfield, Environmental Ethics: an Overview for the 21st Century
(Cambridge: Polity, 2003); J. Benson, Environmental Ethics: an
Introduction with Readings (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); D.
Jamieson (ed.), A Companion to Environmental Philosophy (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001); D. Schmidtz and E. Willott (eds.), Environmental Ethics:
What Really Matters, What Really Works (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002); M.E. Zimmerman (ed.), Environmental Philosophy: from
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology (NJ: Prentice Hall, Third Edition, 2001).
biology is correct, then there is a case that the Aristotelian thinking
in question, and thus the ethical framework at issue, are utterly
indefensible. I scout this conditional conclusion (section 3) by
drawing on some old work due principally to Elliott Sober. Things
then take (what I hope is) an unexpected turn. I claim (section 4)
that recent work on the phenomenon of self-organization in
biological systems might provide an alternative source of support for
the supposedly discredited Aristotelian view in biology, and thus, by
extension, for any position in environmental ethics which depends
on that view. Faced with what appears to be a disconcerting
choice—between (i) the mighty theoretical edifice of Darwinism,
and (ii) an impressively rejuvenated Aristotelianism in biology and
environmental ethics—I spend some time looking at exactly how
the land lies in the disputed region of biological theory (section 5).
I close by drawing some general conclusions for environmental
ethics (section 6).  
As I see it, then, this paper is, at heart, an exercise in the
philosophy of biology, but one with consequences for the kind of
considerations to which environmental ethicists might legitimately
appeal. In my more mischievous moments, however, I am tempted
to put a different spin on things, and to portray the argument as a
sort of Trojan horse parked in the middle of philosophy of
biology. To see why, let’s focus on exactly how the central claims
unfold, when seen from a narrower philosophical perspective. For
a while things progress without much incident. Under cover of a
critical response to a leading position in environmental ethics, I
requisition and adapt for my own purposes an analysis, due
primarily to Sober, according to which there exists a deep
incompatibility between (i) a certain aspect of Darwinian theory
and (ii) a generically Aristotelian account of biological systems
(sections 2 and 3). If (i) is true, then (ii) is false—or so it seems—
and who would dare deny Darwinism? At this juncture, however, I
unleash a controversial thesis about the primary source of biologi-
cal form, a thesis that locates that source in the phenomenon of
self-organization during organismic development (section 4). As I
shall argue, this thesis is recognizably neo-Aristotelian in character.
Thus the conflict between Darwinism and Aristotelianism, far
from being an interesting historical curiosity, appears to be back
squarely on the biological agenda. The remaining task for this
paper (when viewed from the present, narrower perspective) is to
say something about the principles by which this apparent conflict
might ultimately be resolved (section 5). 
Under Darwin’s Cosh?
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2. Wearing Aristotle’s Boots 
Earlier I identified the following as one of the core questions in
environmental ethics: which, if any, non-human natural entities
have independent moral status (are morally considerable in their
own right)?2 Let’s say you believe the answer to this question to be
that human beings alone have independent moral status, with the
only moral status enjoyed by non-human natural entities being
derived from human needs and interests. How might you justify
this view? The most obvious strategy would be to claim that the
possession of some particular property or combination of
properties is necessary for independent moral status, and that
humans alone posssess that property or combination of properties.
One might then expect psychological achievements such as being
rational, being reflectively self-aware, and/or having the capacity for
complex generative language-use to be prime candidates for the
properties in question. But now let’s say you are of a more inclusive
ethical disposition, in that you believe the answer to the target ques-
tion to be that a large sub-set of (and maybe even all) animals—
human and non-human—enjoy independent moral status. In this
case the properties just mentioned would be too restrictive to figure
as necessary conditions here, although they might still be sufficient
conditions. The default strategy for you now would most likely be
to appeal to sentience, marked standardly by the capacity to feel
pain. Sentience is a property that most people (including most
philosophers) would be happy to attribute to many (although
perhaps not all) non-human animals, but not to plants. Moreover,
on the face of it, causing pain is a reasonable candidate for a
morally reprehensible act. So sentience might be promoted as both
a necessary (plants are plausibly ruled out) and a sufficient (most
animals at least are plausibly ruled in) condition for independent
moral status. 
Those without experience of environmental ethics might think
that this sort of animal-centred position is about as inclusive as the
Michael Wheeler
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2 Wading into the debate over which entities have independent moral
status is a convenient way of seeing how the specific philosophical position
in which we are principally interested here gains its plausibility. The
debate in question is complex, however, and I cannot do anything like
proper justice to it here. Indeed, I shall do no more than touch on a small
sub-set of the myriad issues and, aside from our target view, I shall
content myself with greatly simplified versions of the alternative positions
discussed. Anyone whose interest is aroused may follow up the details in
the introductions to environmental ethics listed in note 1.
independent moral status club ever gets; but that would be a
misconception. In environmental ethics it is not uncommon for
theorists to extend independent moral status to plants.3 Once we
take this bold step, it is no longer possible to adopt being sentient as
necessary for independent moral status, although it may still be
sufficient. (I am simply going to ignore the protestations of those
brave and unembarrassed souls who maintain that plants are
sentient, and who thus see no difficulty in maintaining the
necessity of sentience.) So how are we to stake out this new
boundary to independent moral status? The rather obvious move is
to extend independent moral status to each individual living thing, a
position known in the trade as biocentric individualism.4
For my money, the most worked out, systematic, and compelling
version of biocentric individualism remains Paul Taylor’s attitude
of respect for nature.5 At the heart of Taylor’s framework is the idea
of an entity having a good of its own. If an entity has a good of its
own, then it makes sense for us to speak in terms of what is good or
bad for that entity, without us having to make reference to any other
Under Darwin’s Cosh?
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3 Another way of extending independent moral status is to be a holist,
and to hold that certain environmental wholes (e.g. species, ecosystems, the
Earth) are morally considerable in their own right. Holism will not
concern us in this paper. The introductions to environmental ethics listed
in note 1 all discuss holism at some point.  
4 Of course, someone who holds that each individual living thing is
morally considerable in its own right isn’t thereby committed to the
thought that we would never be justified in harming any living thing, but
only to the thought that when one is deciding upon a course of action, the
independent needs and interests of each living thing affected by that
decision must be taken into account.  
5 See P. W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); P. W. Taylor, ‘The
Ethics of Respect for Nature’, Environmental Ethics, 3, No. 3 (1981),
192–218, reprinted in Environmental Philosophy: from Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology, M.E. Zimmerman (ed.) (NJ: Prentice Hall, Third
Edition, 2001), 71–86. To be precise, Taylor restricts the application of his
biocentric individualist framework to wild organisms, and so suggests that
the moral status of domesticated organisms is a separate issue. However,
this qualification is a questionable wrinkle that we can simply ignore. For
a prior and less sophisticated example of biocentric individualism, see
Albert Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for life,’ as developed in his Cultural
Philosophy II: Civilization and Ethics (London: A. and C. Black, 1929,
Translated by John Naish from the 1923 German text). For a biocentric
position that builds on Taylor’s work, see J. Sterba, ‘From Biocentric
Individualism to Biocentric Pluralism’, Environmental Ethics, 17, No. 2
(1995), 191–207.
entity. Consider my watch. In ordinary conversation we might
happily talk in terms of it being good for this watch to be regularly
serviced. However, a moment’s reflection shows that if we really
want to understand the meaning of this sort of statement, we will
be forced to make reference to the purposes and/or the needs of
some other (in this case, human) entity. This additional entity might
be the designer of the watch (whose purpose was to bestow an
accurate timekeeper on the world) or its current user (whose needs
and goals, such as arriving at the railway station on time, are
furthered by having a precision timepiece). In the final analysis, it
is the goods of these other entities that are furthered by the watch
being regularly serviced. By contrast, suppose I say that it would be
good for my father to have a hernia operation. That statement will
be true or false, depending on whether it really would advance my
father’s good to have such an operation, but unpacking the meaning
here requires no reference to the purposes and/or needs of any
entity in addition to my father. In familiar ethical language, then, a
watch is merely a means to an end, and never an end in itself,
whereas a human being, who may at times be a means to an end, is
always also an end in his or her self. 
So, for some entities, it is true to say that they have goods of their
own; for others, it isn’t. But where do we draw the line? According
to Taylor—and here’s where the biocentric individualism kicks in—
for each individual living thing, it is true to say that that entity has a
good of its own. What grounds this claim? Here it is useful to
consider Taylor’s analysis of butterfly life: 
…once we come to understand [the butterfly’s] life cycle and
know the environmental conditions it needs to survive in a
healthy state, we have no difficulty in speaking about what is
beneficial to it and what might be harmful to it. A butterfly that
develops through the egg, the larva, and pupa stages of its life in
a normal manner, and then emerges as a healthy adult that carries
on its existence under favorable environmental conditions, might
well be said to thrive and prosper. It fares well, successfully
adapting to its physical surroundings and maintaining the normal
biological functions of its species throughout its entire span of
life. When all these things are true of it, we are warranted in
concluding that the good of this particular insect has been fully
realized. It has lived at a high level of well-being. From the
perspective of the butterfly’s world, it has had a good life.6
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6 Respect for Nature, op. cit. note 3, 66.
According to Taylor, then, the individual butterfly has a good life
when (a) it undergoes the normal developmental process that
butterflies standardly undergo, (b) it has a healthy adult life (in the
context of the lives normally led by members of its species), (c) it
successfully adapts to its physical surroundings, and (d) it maintains
the normal biological functions of its species throughout its life. As
far as I can see, satisfying conditions (a)-(c) constitutes part of what
it means to satisfy condition (d). An organism couldn’t be said to
maintain the normal biological functions of its species throughout
its life if it didn’t undergo a normal species-specific developmental
trajectory, have a healthy adult life, or successfully adapt to its phys-
ical surroundings. Here, then, is the key point: for each individual
living thing, we can make sense of that organism as flourishing
when, throughout its life, it succeeds in realizing the biological
functions that are normal for organisms of that species, and as
failing to flourish whenever it fails to realize those functions. It is
because we always have this benchmark for what counts as the
flourishing of a particular individual living thing that we can
rightly speak of each individual living thing as having a good of its
own.7
Four features of Taylor’s concept of an entity’s own good deserve
emphasis:
1. What counts as the good of a particular animal or plant is fixed
relative to the species of which that animal or plant is a
member. As Taylor explains, in ‘order to know what a
particular organism’s good consists in… it is necessary to know
its species-specific characteristics. These characteristics
include the cellular structure of the organism, the internal
functioning of its various parts, and its external relations to
Under Darwin’s Cosh?
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7 For Taylor, being an individual living thing may not quite constitute a
necessary condition for an entity to have a good of its own. Parenthetically
he raises the issue of artificial intelligence, and resolves to remain open-
minded about a possible future in which we feel compelled to say of a robot
that it genuinely has a good of its own, independently of its designer’s
purposes. Taylor’s position here is not quite clear. If he were prepared to
say that such a robot were literally alive, then he might hold that being an
individual thing is a necessary condition for an entity to have a good of its
own. But, in the following passage, Taylor hesitates to extend the concept
of life to robots, and suggests that a different system of ethics might be
required in such a case: ‘If mechanisms (organisms?) of artificial
intelligence were ever to be produced, another system of ethics might have
to be applied to the treatment of such entities by moral agents’ (Respect
for Nature, op. cit. note 3, 125, emphasis added). 
other organisms and to the physical-chemical aspects of its
environment. Unless we learn how the organism develops,
grows and sustains its life according to the laws of its species-
specific nature, we cannot fully understand what promotes the
realization of its good or what is detrimental to its good.’8
2. Although Taylor is not entirely clear about the conceptual
relation that obtains between a species-specific biological
function and a species-specific characteristic, it seems, on the
whole, that he conceives of species-specific characteristics as
material factors that underlie or support some biological
function. (The cellular structure of the organism, for example,
fits this profile.). Re-reading the quotation immediately above
through this lens, we can now see that, for Taylor,
understanding organisms, and thus in what the goods of those
organisms consist, requires two interlocking explanatory
domains, that of biological function and that of material
underpinning. 
3. Whether or not an entity has a good of its own is independent
of whether or not that entity is, even in principle, consciously
aware of in what that good consists, and so may consciously
organize its behaviour with the goal of furthering that good. In
other words, for Taylor, sentience is not a necessary condition
for an entity to have a good of its own. That’s why individual
non-sentient animals (if there are any) and individual plants
have a good of their own in just as robust a sense as individual
sentient animals. This is, of course, exactly what one would
expect from a biocentric individualist position. 
4. Whether or not an organism is flourishing is a fully objective
fact about that organism, a fact that is susceptible to human
investigation once we have the requisite knowledge about the
organism’s species-specific characteristics. This state of affairs
means that human beings are, in principle, able to make
judgments from the standpoint of an organism’s own good,
even if that organism is not itself capable of making such
judgments.
As we shall see, Taylor’s concept of an entity’s own good is far from
the whole of his biocentric individualism. Indeed, sharp-eyed
readers will have noticed that, so far, I haven’t even mentioned the
notion of independent moral status. More on that soon. First
though I want to take a brief stroll through some familiar historical
territory, in order to substantiate the claim that Taylor’s concept of
Michael Wheeler
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8 Respect for Nature, op. cit. note 3, 68.
an entity’s own good is recognizably and robustly Aristotelian in
character. 
Aristotle’s term psuche is usually translated as ‘soul.’9 This can be
misleading, however, since to the modern ear the word ‘soul’
suggests a spiritual mode of existence; and that clashes unhelpfully
with most of what Aristotle says about the psuche, which is
resolutely naturalistic. (I say ‘most of’ here in view of Aristotle’s
notorious cave-in over the intellect, the one component of the
psuche that he claims is immortal and eternal.10) In view of the
shortcomings of the term ‘soul’ in this context, it is better, I think,
to start with Aristotle’s claim that each species of organism may be
identified by a set of biological capacities that, under normal
circumstances, any individual member of that species will come to
express. Correlatively, each organism will have associated with it
one of these sets of (what I shall call) life-capacities; and that set
constitutes its psuche. The master-list of such life-capacities, from
which the lists that specify particular psuches will be drawn, looks
something like this: self-nourishment (including growth and decay),
reproduction, appetite, touch, non-tactile forms of perception, self-
controlled motion, imagination, and intellectual reasoning. Here the
various life-capacities have been arranged in order of, as Aristotle
would see it, increasing sophistication. This is not an idle
presentational move, since, according to Aristotle, the possession of
Under Darwin’s Cosh?
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9 Aristotle, ‘De Anima (On the Soul)’, The Complete Works of Aristotle,
J. Barnes (ed.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, Revised
Oxford Translation, Volume 1), 641–92. The brief analysis of the psuche
which I include here draws, in part, on the following paper of mine: M.
Wheeler, ‘Cognition’s Coming Home: the Reunion of Life and Mind’,
Fourth European Conference on Artificial Life, P. Husbands and I. Harvey
(eds.) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 10–19. That paper
constitutes a very different philosophical project (the goal of which is to
show that the discipline of artificial life has the credentials to be the
intellectual core of a distinctively biological cognitive science, one which
holds that life and mind share a common set of organizational principles).
Nevertheless, in that work I pursue issues that surface again here. In
particular, my later discussions in this paper of (i) the Aristotelian nature
of certain recent self-organization-based accounts of biological form and
(ii) the implications of Kauffman’s N-K model draw, in part, on that
previous investigation. 
10 ‘De Anima’ op. cit. note 9, Book 3, chapter 5. For discussion, see, for
example, K. V. Wilkes’ ‘Final Embarrassed Postscript’ (her words not
mine) in her ‘Psuche versus the Mind’, Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, M.
C. Nussbaum and A. Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992),
109–127.
any particular life-capacity presupposes the possession of the less
sophisticated life-capacities from this list. So, for example, the
possession of touch presupposes the possession of appetite,
reproduction, and self-nourishment. On this picture, then, self-
nourishment, the most primitive of the life-capacities, is possessed
by every living thing. Moreover, it emerges as being necessary and
sufficient for life. This, I think, is the right way to understand
Aristotle’s claim that ‘the nutritive soul is found along with all the
others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of
soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have
life’11
Next we need to add in a well-known aspect of Aristotle’s account
of the psuche. Famously, Aristotle draws what he takes to be a
widely applicable distinction between form and matter. To a first
approximation, the form of an entity is its distinctive mode of
organization. Thus Aristotle tells us that a statue’s shape is its form,
while its matter is the physical stuff (bronze, stone, or whatever) out
of which it is made. The form of an axe is its capacity to chop, while
its matter is the wood and metal out of which it is made. Moving
into the biological world, the form of the eye is capacity to see, while
the matter, according to Aristotle’s ancient biology, consists largely
of water. When Aristotle applies the form-matter distinction to
whole living organisms, we are told that the form of a living
creature is its psuche, its set of life-capacities; the matter is the
organic body which underlies those capacities.12 Against this back-
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11 ‘De Anima’ op. cit. note 9, Book 2, chapter 4, 415; p. 661 in the cited
edition.  
12 Here I am ignoring all sorts of nuances and difficulties. For example,
it is clear that while the canonical example of a form (a statue’s shape)
allows form to be interpretable as structure, other examples (an axe’s
capacity to chop, an eye’s capacity to see) somehow involve an additional
notion of function. My use of the phrase ‘distinctive mode of
organization’ is supposed to fudge this distinction (which is why I called
my characterization a ‘first approximation’). The issue of form and
function (and so functionalism) in Aristotle is now an industry in
Aristotelian scholarship. (See many of the papers in the aforementioned
Nussbaum and Oksenberg Rorty collection on De Anima. For an
evolutionarily oriented take on the issue, see my ‘Cognition’s Coming
Home: the Reunion of Life and Mind’, op. cit. note 9.) In addition,
Aristotle himself characterizes the relationship between form and matter
in a different way when he turns from a non-biological to a biological
context. Roughly, he suggests that the matter of a statue is only
contingently enformed by its shape, whereas the organic body is
essentially enformed by the relevant psuche. See, famously, J. L. Ackrill,
ground, an Aristotelian organism may be glossed as what Charles
calls an ‘interactive unity’ of matter and form.13 One way of playing
out this idea is as follows. On the one hand, the material (neurobio-
logical/biochemical) aspects of an organism must be understood in
terms of the biological forms (life-capacities) which those aspects
generate and maintain. On the other, to do justice to this
explanatory demand, one needs an account of organic matter as
essentially a dynamic potentiality for generating biological form.14
The concept of the psuche also grounds Aristotle’s own version of
the idea that every organism may be said to have a good of its own.
One can see Aristotle appealing to the idea of organisms having
goods of their own when he says, for example, that ‘mutilated or
imperfect growths’ occur when organisms fail to ‘produce their
species and rise to completeness of nature and decay to an end.’15
Given that the terms ‘mutilation’ and ‘imperfect’ clearly signal fail-
ures to flourish, it seems that the notion of a ‘completeness of
nature’ is equivalent to the concept of an organism’s own good.
Moreover, when an organism ‘rises to completeness of nature,’
before decaying naturally to an end, it may be understood as having
flourished by fully expressing the set of life-capacities associated
with its species. Thus the good of an organism consists in the full
expression of the appropriate species-specific set of life-capacities.16
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‘Aristotle’s Definitions of Psuche’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
73 (1972–3), 119–33. For one response to this problem, see C. Shields,
‘Aristotle’s Psychology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/aristotle-psychology 
13 D. Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
14 See A. Code and J. Moravcsik, ‘Explaining Various Forms of Living’,
Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, M. C. Nussbaum and A. Oksenberg Rorty
(eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 138-41. 
15 ‘De Anima’ op. cit. note 9, Book 3, chapter 9, 432; p. 688 in the cited
edition. 
16 I should confess that Aristotle’s account of the psuche is not quite as
straightforward as I have made out in the main text. For one thing, he gives
different master-lists of life-capacities in different places. For another,
there are exegetical disputes among scholars about exactly how the various
life-capacities ought to be divided-up. Finally, the relationship of presup-
position may not always be as straightforward as I have suggested. These
admissions need not concern us here, however, because these fine-grained
details of the psuche, while important in other contexts, do not bear on the
argument of this paper. For a systematic analysis of the structure of the
There are obvious similarities between Taylor’s notion of a set of
biological functions and Aristotle’s notion of a set of life-capacities.
Both are to be unpacked as species-specific suites of biological
traits, both determine in what the goods of particular organisms
consist, and both need to be understood as specifying the formal (or
functional) half of the form-matter (function-matter) unity that, on
either account, constitutes an organism. But just how deep do the
similarities go? My answer to this question will come in two parts.
First I shall argue that while it is true that Taylor’s ethical thinking
endorses a fact-value distinction in a way that Aristotle’s (arguably)
doesn’t, this divergence is not as important as it might initially
appear. Crucially, both theories use the concept and the details of an
organism’s own good as the basis for specifying certain moral
norms. This shared strategy is built on the principle that for an
organism to have independent moral status, it is necessary that that
organism can rightly be said to have a good of its own. Having iden-
tified this structural parallel, I shall argue (second part) that in
order for ethical norms to be based on biological facts in this way, a
certain understanding of biological systems—crucially, an
Aristotelian one—must be in play. So it turns out that Taylor’s
position in environmental ethics implicitly buys into a fundamental
feature of Aristotelian biology. And that’s where the fun really
starts.
Consider, then, the following question: how do we get from
biology to ethics? For Aristotle, the distinction between biological
(more generally, scientific) fact and ethical value did not loom large
in the way that it does for many contemporary philosophers.
Indeed, as far as the Aristotelian framework is concerned, it seems
that the following position is licensed: once one has correctly
identified the set of life-capacities associated with a particular
species, one not only knows in what the good of an individual
member of that species consists, and thus what would count as
harming that individual (namely preventing that individual from
coming to express fully its complete set of life-capacities), one also
has a duty, in one’s moral deliberations, to factor in the causing of
such harm as a negative component.17
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psuche, see G. B. Matthews, ‘De Anima 2. 2-4 and the Meaning of Life’,
Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, M. C. Nussbaum and A. Oksenberg Rorty
(eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 185-93. Reprinted as ‘Aristotle on Life,’
The Philosophy of Artificial Life, M. A. Boden (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 304–13.
17 This point is nicely made by Des Jardins. See J. R. Des Jardins,
Environmental Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 24–5. 
For Taylor, by contrast, one cannot simply read off ethical norms
from biological nature in this way. He argues as follows: 
1. In order for an entity to be granted independent moral status,
it must be true to say, of that entity, that it has a good of its
own. 
2. Each organism has a good of its own. 
3. However, to say that an organism has a good of its own is a
statement of biological (i.e. scientific) fact.
4. Ethical norms are not logically deducible from such facts.
5. So it is consistent to assert that a particular organism has a
good of its own while simultaneously denying that moral
agents have a duty (all things being equal) to promote or
preserve that good. 
In other words, an entity having a good of its own is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for that entity to be granted independent
moral status. It is not a sufficient condition because there exists a
gap between scientific facts and moral values. Nevertheless, Taylor
does hold that each organism enjoys independent moral status. So
what carries us across the fact-value divide? Here Taylor identifies
four nature-regarding beliefs that, he argues, one ought to hold.
Together these beliefs make up (what he calls) the biocentric outlook
on nature. In banner headline terms, the beliefs in question are (i)
that human beings, along with all other organisms, are members of
a community of life on Earth, (ii) that organisms form webs of
ecological interdependence, (iii) that each organism is a unique
individual pursuing its species-specific good in its own way, and (iv)
that humans are not inherently superior to other living things. The
plausibility of, and the relations between, these four beliefs need not
concern us here. Our interest is in Taylor’s claim that once one
endorses the biocentric outlook, a commitment to the independent
moral status of individual living things becomes the only suitable
moral stance to adopt. So once one adopts the biocentric outlook,
one is rationally (although not logically) compelled to grant
individual organisms independent moral status. In Taylor’s
framework, this means that one must regulate one’s actions by
reference to an affected organism’s own good, that is, by reference
to the ways in which the action in question promotes or hinders that
organism in coming to express the scientifically identifiable set of
species-specific biological traits in which its own good consists. In
effect, this move forges a non-demonstrative connection between bio-
logical facts and moral values. Moral values are, as Taylor puts it,
‘based on’ biological facts. 
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The common core of our two theoretical frameworks may now be
revealed. For the sake of simplicity, let’s stipulate that an action is
to be considered in isolation from other actions, and in relation only
to a single affected organism. Then, for both our theories, the moral
permissibility or otherwise of an action, when performed by some
moral agent (see below), will be determined by the (positive,
neutral, or negative) effects which that action will have on the
likelihood of an affected organism coming or continuing to express
the distinctive species-specific set of biological traits in which that
organism’s own good consists. This shared strategy for specifying
ethical norms by reference to biological facts (what I shall from now
on call, simply, ‘the shared strategy’) rests on the similarly shared
claim that it is a necessary condition for an entity to be morally
considerable in its own right that that entity have a good if its own.
The Aristotelian theory differs from Taylor’s here by making the
possession of such a good a sufficient, as well as a necessary,
condition for independent moral status. This move renders the
route from biology to ethics direct, of course, but, as long as there
exists some alternative machinery for making the fact-value
transition (in Taylor’s theory this is the biocentric outlook), the
sufficiency claim is not required for the target strategy to get off the
ground. The necessity claim, however, is. In both theories, certain
biological facts are always available to play the key norm-specifying
role precisely because, for each individual living thing, there always
exists a set of scientifically identifiable species-specific biological
traits (those in which the good of that organism consists) that can be
used as a kind of moral manual. 
Given the shared strategy, to what understanding of biological
systems are our two theories committed? This is where we run
headlong into what Elliott Sober calls Aristotle’s natural state
model.18 As Sober explains, this model supplies us with a procedure
for thinking about diversity and variation in nature. Aristotle
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18 E. Sober, ‘Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism’,
Philosophy of Science 47 (1980), 350–83; reprinted in Conceptual Issues in
Evolutionary Biology E. Sober (ed.) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994,
second edition, from which page numbers are taken), 16–89. See also E.
Sober, ‘Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism’, The Preservation
of Species: the Value of Biological Diversity, B. Norton (ed.) (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 173-95; reprinted in Environmental
Ethics, R. Elliott (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 226–47. In
the latter paper, Sober argues that some positions in environmental ethics
are problematic because they implicitly endorse the natural state model.
More on this in note 25 below. 
argued that all natural objects, including organisms, have a natural
state towards which they will inevitably gravitate, in the absence of
interfering forces. In other words, interfering forces obstruct the
natural tendencies of natural objects to reach or to stay in their
natural states. Diversity and variation in natural objects are thus
conceived as deviations from the natural states of those objects,
caused by the operation of interfering forces. For example, in
Aristotle’s physics, the natural state of all sublunar heavy objects is
to be located at the centre of the Earth, although the natural
tendency that such entities have to achieve this state is often
thwarted by interfering forces. Similarly, and crucially for us,
although the natural state of all organisms is to express their full set
of life-capacities, interfering forces may frustrate the natural
tendency that such entities have to achieve this state. 
Interlude: In Aristotle’s own thinking, the natural state model of
biological systems was, of course, embedded within a strongly
teleological picture in which the natural world in general was
conceived as literally purposeful and as literally goal-driven. This
perspective has largely been discredited by the advance of modern
science and its philosophical bedfellows. It is worth noting here that
the widespread rejection of the strongly teleological view of nature
does not herald the demise of the natural state model in science.
Indeed, if we put an Aristotelian gloss on Newton’s first law of
motion, then that law says that a body will remain in its natural state
of being either at rest or in uniform motion unless it is acted upon
by a force. (Here, any force counts as an interfering force.) So the
natural state model remains enshrined in Newtonian physics, and
no one who is thinking in a non-metaphorical key believes that it is
the goal or purpose of a body to remain either at rest or in uniform
motion.19 The message is that the strongly teleological dimension of
Aristotle’s own natural state model can, in principle, be discarded,
leaving the rest of the model intact. Still, physics is physics and
biology is biology. In biology, teleological language remains in force.
The purpose of the heart is to pump blood, the male peacock’s tail
evolved to be large and decorated in order to attract mates, and so on.
The standard trick, of course, is to reconceive one’s teleology
within a Darwinian framework. Ignoring all sorts of nuances and
complications, the story goes like this. Where natural selection has
been operative, individual organisms in the present generation will
tend to express those phenotypic traits that have bestowed fitness
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19 This Aristotelian gloss on Newton’s first law of motion is also to be
found in Sober; see Sober, ‘Evolution, Population Thinking, and
Essentialism’, op. cit. note 18, 168–9. 
advantages on their ancestors. Such traits are adaptations; and the
purpose, function or goal of an adaptation will be to carry out the
fitness-enhancing task that it performed in ancestral populations.
By way of this Darwinization, teleological concepts are
underwritten historically, and are thereby made to behave
themselves in relation to a physics that has discarded teleology
altogether. I take it that Aristotle would most likely have approved
of this naturalization of teleology. So that’s not where the clash with
Darwinism arises.20
Back to the main plot: it is easy enough to see how what I am
calling the shared strategy may lean on the natural state model of
biological systems, so let’s spell it out. Buying Aristotelian physics
for a moment, there is a clear sense in which, for heavy objects (and
that includes organisms treated purely as heavy objects), all
interfering forces are on a moral par: since heavy objects (qua heavy
objects) are not the kinds of entities that have goods of their own,
none of the interfering forces that prevent those objects from
reaching their natural states are ethically significant. By contrast, in
the case of organisms, all of which have goods of their own, and all
of which are morally considerable in their own right, some
interfering forces are ethically significant, namely those interfering
forces that emanate from the actions of moral agents. When the
action of a moral agent frustrates the natural tendency of an
organism to reach its natural state (to express the species-specific set
of biological traits in which its good consists), that action,
considered in isolation from other actions, and only in relation to
that organism, ought to be judged morally reprehensible.
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20 To keep everything above board, I should confess that there is a
tension between Taylor’s biocentric individualism and a Darwinized
teleology. Taylor often writes of organisms as teleological centres of life.
This locution signals the belief (a component of the biocentric outlook, see
main text) that each organism is a unique individual pursuing its species-
specific good in its own way. In unpacking this idea Taylor explicitly
resists a move that might seem to be on the cards following the proposed
Darwinization of teleology, namely to identify the concept of an organism
realizing its own good with the concept of Darwinian fitness (See Respect
for Nature, op. cit. note 3, 121, footnote 7.) Taylor points out that some
individual organisms (e.g. some social insects) sacrifice their lives (and
thus their own goods) to enhance the probability that their genes will
survive into future generations (thus increasing their inclusive fitness), and
he observes that some human beings freely choose to forego having
children (thus reducing their fitness) in order, as they see things, to realize
a good life.
The connection between the shared strategy and Aristotle’s
natural state model of biological systems may be even tighter than
I have just suggested. Indeed, unless it is true to say that each
individual organism has a natural tendency to develop and maintain
the very set of biological traits which putatively constitutes that
organism’s own good, it is hard (I think) to see how the strategy of
delineating ethical norms by reference to such sets of traits is
supposed to work at all. Put very crudely, the underlying
dependency looks like this: if the organism’s life isn’t going
somewhere, then nothing we might do to that organism can count as
hindering the flourishing of that life, in which case the suggestion
that such allegedly obstructive interference on our part ought to
count as morally reprehensible is a non-starter. The shared strategy
requires, in addition, that the ‘somewhere’ in question is the full
expression of a distinctive set of species-specific biological traits.
But if all this is right, then that strategy, and thus Taylor’s
biocentric individualism, requires that some version of the
Aristotelian natural state model of biological systems be correct, a
version in which the relevant class of natural states is fleshed out in
terms of certain species-specific sets of biological traits. 
The conclusion of this section is that a prominent position in
contemporary environmental ethics, namely Taylor’s biocentric
individualism, is, at heart, a neo-Aristotelian venture. In the next
section I review some powerful reasons for thinking that if modern
evolutionary theory is true, then the requirement that we have just
located at the base of this framework—the requirement that the
Aristotelian natural state model of biological systems be correct—
will not be met. In other words, as far as this paper is concerned, the
Aristotelian natural state model of biological systems is the
principal target of Darwin’s cosh. 
3. Against the Natural State Model
According to Ernst Mayr, Darwin’s legacy was threefold. He
presented a mass of evidence that evolution occurs, he proposed
natural selection as the mechanism of evolutionary change, and
(crucially given our present interests) he replaced typological
thinking by population thinking.21 At root, the natural state model
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21 Ernst Mayr, ‘Typological versus Population Thinking’, in his
Evolution and the Diversity of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1976), 26–9; reprinted in Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology,
E. Sober (ed.) (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1994, second edition, from
which page numbers are taken), 157–60. 
in biology is an example of typological thinking. There are species-
types, identified as species-specific sets of biological characteristics.
Individuals realize these species-types only imperfectly, due to the
operation of interfering forces. Darwinian population thinking, by
contrast, finds no place for types of this sort. The biological realm
is not conceptualized as a place in which individual organisms have
a natural tendency to realize some set of common characteristics
that constitutes their generic species-type, or in which diversity is
the product of interfering forces that deflect individuals from the
path towards that state of species-wide uniformity. Rather, as Mayr
puts it, ‘[all] organisms and organic phenomena are composed of
unique features and can be described collectively only in statistical
terms.’22 In other words, individual variation is the fundamental way
of things—the base-line of biological nature. 
One way to illuminate the deep differences between these
approaches is to see how they would handle some data from
developmental biology. So let’s call on the geneticist’s best friend,
the fruit-fly Drosophila. There are usually about 1000 light-receptor
cells in the Drosophila compound eye. Genetic mutations can reduce
the number of receptors dramatically, but genetic events are not the
only causal factors in the developmental equation. As Lewontin
reports,23 the final number of receptors also depends on the
environmental temperature at which the flies develop. For example,
if flies with the wild (statistically most common in nature) genotype
develop at a temperature of 15° centigrade, they will end up with
1100 receptors; but they will have only 750 receptors if the
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22 Op. cit. note 21, 158. Mayr’s analysis gives us a template for how to
explain biological nature. However, in the paper in question there is,
intertwined with this explanatory template, a picture of the different
metaphysical commitments that underlie typological and population
thinking respectively. Mayr argues that for the typological thinker types
are real while individual variation is an illusion, whereas for the population
thinker varying individuals are real while ‘types’ (understood as statistical
abstractions, as averages over populations of individuals) are not. Sober,
rightly in my view, rejects both halves of this claim. (See Sober,
‘Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism’, op. cit. note 18.) In
the present context Mayr’s questionable metaphysical picture need not be
a cause for concern. His key insight concerning the explanatory priority of
individual variation in population thinking does not depend on the dubi-
ous metaphysical window-dressing he supplies, and so may be formulated
without it (which is what I have endeavoured to do in the main text). I take
it that this is Sober’s view also.      
23 R. Lewontin, ‘The Organism as the Subject and Object of Evolution’,
Scientia 118 (1983), 63-82. 
developmental temperature is as high as 30° centigrade. And things
get more complicated once we allow, in addition, variations in the
genotype, and consider the ensuing pattern of interactions with the
relevant environmental factor. For example, Drosophila with a
mutation known as Ultrabar always end up with less visual
receptors than those with wild genotype. The same is true of
Drosophila with a different mutation, Infrabar. However, the two
mutant genotypes have opposite relations to temperature, such that
the number of receptors possessed by Ultrabar flies decreases with
developmental temperature, while the number possessed by
Infrabar flies increases. In fact, if we make two plots of the number
of light receptors against developmental temperature, one for
Ultrabar and one for Infrabar (more on this idea in a moment), the
two curves will cross over.
How is this developmental space to be conceptualized?24 Let’s
begin with the natural state model. According to the strict
interpretation of this model, there will be a unique number of light
receptors that constitutes the natural phenotypic outcome for
insects of this species, although interfering forces during
morphogenesis may well mean that this number is often not
realized. (In a more relaxed frame of mind, we might allow that the
relevant natural state may be specified in a mildly disjunctive way,
such that, for example, the natural state will be realized if the
number of light-receptors takes any one from a limited, small range
of values. This does not alter the fundamental character of the
explanation, so, for ease of exposition, I shall continue to work with
the strict interpretation.) Each of the mutation-driven, tempera-
ture-driven, or interactive variations in phenotypic form that we
identified in the data above needs to be characterized as a deviation
from some natural state—the natural phenotype. The most likely
candidate for the natural phenotype is a compound eye with 1000
light-receptor cells (or some appropriately relaxed take on that
phenotype). However, this is not the only option. There is no
requirement in the natural state model that the privileged pheno-
type be statistically the most common.
Now let’s turn to the approach recommended by population
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24 My brief analysis of Drosophila morphogenesis that follows is, in
essence, the local application of a general theoretical analysis, advanced by
Sober, of the different ways in which natural state thinking and population
thinking approach development; see his ‘Evolution, Population Thinking,
and Essentialism’, op. cit. note 18. In that paper Sober considers, only to
reject, a number of different moves designed to reduce the tension
between the natural state model and population thinking. 
biology. The population geneticist will appeal to the concept of a
norm of reaction. We’ve just seen this idea at work. A norm of
reaction is a curve generated by taking a particular genotype, and
plotting changes in a phenotypic trait of interest (in our example,
the number of receptors) against an environmental variable (in our
example, the developmental temperature). In effect, a norm of
reaction shows how an organism of a particular genotype would
develop in different environments. So one might conceptualize our
fruit-fly developmental space in terms of a set of norms of reaction.
This way of thinking enshrines individual variation at the root of
biological nature. Each norm of reaction identifies a range of
possible developmental outcomes for a particular genotype.
Moreover, there is a deep sense in which, in terms of our
understanding of the fundamental character of biological systems,
each of these outcomes, and each of the outcomes for each of the
different possible genotypes, is conceptualized as being on an equal
footing. Of course, it may be true to say of the fruit-fly not only (a)
that there is a wild genotype, but also (b) that in its ordinary
developmental ecology, the temperature is regularly within a small
range of values. This might explain why the number of light-
receptor cells in the Drosophila compound eye is usually about 1000.
Nevertheless this situation, riddled as it is with statistical and envi-
ronment-relative contingency, seems to fall short of establishing the
dual presence of a uniquely privileged developmental outcome and
an associated tendency for the organism in question to realize that
outcome—the kind of constrained developmental profile that the
natural state model requires.  
These apparent problems with the natural state model
reverberate into environmental ethics. If the third Darwinian
contribution identified by Mayr is on the mark, and the base-line of
biological nature really is that actual organisms are, at root, no more
than points on a vast landscape of phenotypic diversity, rather than
enforced offshoots from a path that leads to a preferred species-
specific destination, then it is hard to give any conceptual weight to
the idea that in perturbing the developmental trajectory of an
organism, we are preventing it from realizing its natural state. Any
philosophical strategy for specifying ethical norms that rests on that
idea is thereby undermined; and that includes Taylor’s biocentric
individualism.25 But have we got the base-line right? Our first
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25 As mentioned above, in his paper ‘Philosophical Problems for
Environmentalism’ (op. cit. note 18, 233–40), Sober traces certain difficul-
ties facing some environmentalist positions to their implicit adoption of
the natural state model. Sober’s target is the very general claim, plausibly
flirtation with contemporary developmental biology certainly
suggests that we have; but perhaps all is not as it seems.
4. Kick-Starting Aristotelianism 
I now want to suggest that we have been moving too fast, and that
there is, in truth, growing support in contemporary biological
science for something which looks very much like an Aristotelian
natural state model of organismic development.26 Self-organization
is a phenomenon that is now recognized as being widespread in
nature—and that includes human nature. Indeed, it appears that
wherever we look (e.g. at chemical reactions, lasers, slime moulds,
foraging by ants, flocking behaviour in creatures such as birds,
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at work in a number of environmentalist positions, that what is morally
reprehensible about an action that frustrates an organism’s endogenous
developmental tendency to reach its natural state is that any such action
places the organism concerned in an unnatural state. As Sober points out,
once development is conceptualized on the population biology model, the
idea that any one phenotype is the only natural one is deeply problematic.
The worry about neo-Aristotelian environmentalism that I present here
clearly reprises Sober’s critique in certain respects, although I have
endeavoured to add fuel to the fire by showing in detail exactly how that
natural state model underlies the detailed neo-Aristotelian structure of one
prominent environmental-ethical framework. More importantly, as we
shall see, I think the natural state model lives to fight another day, where-
as Sober doesn’t.   
26 I am not the only person to have claimed recently that modern
biological science is inadvertently rediscovering supposedly discarded
Aristotelian concepts and principles. For example, Denis Walsh has been
arguing that contemporary evolutionary developmental biology explains
why organisms have the particular phenotypes they do (and in particular,
the organismal capacities that underlie the evolvability of organismal
lineages) by appealing to a reciprocal relation between the goal-directed
plasticity of organisms and the causal powers of their underlying
developmental systems. According to Walsh, this reciprocal arrangement
maps onto, and, in the end, plays the same fundamental explanatory role
as, the kind of interactive unity between a biological form and its realizing
matter that constitutes an Aristotelian organismal nature. See D. Walsh,
‘Evolutionary Essentialism’, unpublished conference paper given at
Teleology, Ancient and Modern, University of Edinburgh, 16–18 August
2004. Although the analysis that follows in this paper exploits different
aspects of Aristotelian philosophy of biology and of contemporary
developmental biology, it is clearly an overlapping and complementary
approach. 
human infant walking, neural processing in the brain, traffic jams…
the list is just about endless), there is compelling research to suggest
that the concept of self-organization will contribute to our
understanding of how things work. Biological systems, and more
particularly organismic development, have, as we shall see,
provided a particularly fertile breeding ground for self-organization-
based thinking.27 So what is self-organization? A system is said to
self-organize when its components causally interact with each other
so as to produce the autonomous emergence and maintenance of
structured global order. The term ‘autonomous’ is here being used
to indicate nothing more fancy than (i) that the global behaviour of
the system in question is not being organized by some (inner or
outer) controlling executive that dictates or orchestrates the activity
of the individual components, and (ii) that those individual compo-
nents do not make their contributions by accessing and following
some comprehensive plan of the global behaviour, but rather by
following purely local principles of causal interaction. Formal
definitions aside, the best way to get a grip on self-organization is to
consider an example. So let’s take one from the arena that is of
principal interest to us, namely organismic development. 
To the untrained eye, the higher plants realize a bewildering and
stunning variety of leaf arrangements. However, there are really only
three generic forms present in nature. The most frequent of these is
spiral phyllotaxis (phyllo-taxis = leaf-order). Spiral phyllotaxis is a
pattern of organization in which successive leaves on the stem appear
at a fixed angle of rotation relative to each other. Amazingly, natural
instances of spiral phyllotaxis are such that only a very few angles of
rotation are ever realized; and the most common angle of rotation to
be found is 137·5°. How might one explain these facts? I shall focus
on an account due to Brian Goodwin.28
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27 For seminal appeals to self-organization in biology, see, for example:
B. Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed its Spots: the Evolution of
Complexity (London: Phoenix, 1994); S. Kauffman, The Origins or Order:
Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993). For typically lively and incisive discussion, see J.
Maynard Smith, Shaping Life: Genes, Embryos and Evolution (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998).
28 Op. cit. note 27, 105–19. I have used this example a number of times
before to introduce the idea of self-organization in biological development,
but then it is such a good example. See, for example, M. Wheeler, ‘Do
Genes Code for Traits?’, Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science:
Selected Contributed Papers from the 11th International Congress of Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro and G.
Kurczewski (eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 151–4. 
According to Goodwin, as leaf-tissue grows, it places pressure on
an elastic surface layer of epidermal cells. This pressure causes the
epidermal cells to synthesize cellulose microfibrils to resist the
force. Where the next leaf will grow is determined by the fact that,
as a result of exactly where the stress has been placed, and exactly
how the cellulose defences are laid down, the resistance to growth
will be stronger in some areas of the epidermal layer than in others.
Thus the global phenotypic leaf arrangement results from a
sequence of local causal interactions between (i) the growing leaves
under the epidermal surface, and (ii) the barricades of defending
cellulose microfibrils. To provide support for such a view, Goodwin
cites modelling studies which show that the phyllotactic
arrangements observed in nature are stable patterns produced by
such a system. This done, the challenge is to explain why these
arrangements are the only stable arrangements generated by that
system. Here Goodwin appeals to a second model which
demonstrates that if (a) the rate of leaf formation is above a critical
value, and (b) the system starts with the most-commonly-found
initial pattern of leaf primordia in the growing tip, then the
developing plant will tend overwhelmingly to settle on spiral
phyllotaxis with an angle of rotation of 137·5°. In other words,
given certain parameter-values and initial conditions, the most
common phyllotactic arrangement found in nature is the generic
form produced by the self-organizing dynamics in the model.
Moreover, with different values for certain key parameters in the
model (e.g., the growth rates and the number of leaves generated at
any one time), the other phyllotactic arrangements observed in
nature may be generated from the same basic self-organizing
dynamics.
Examples of developmental self-organization could be multi-
plied—Goodwin himself describes a good number of compelling
cases—but you get the idea. The question for us is this: why is this
way of understanding organismic development fundamentally
Aristotelian in character? The immediate answer (although one that
stands in need of refinement) is that developmental self-
organization puts back on the theoretical map the supposedly
heretical thought that organisms have natural states towards which
they will inevitably gravitate, in the absence of interfering forces.
The idea here has two facets: (i) developmental gravitation may be
conceived in terms of the underlying principles of change that
explain the generic dynamics exhibited by particular developmental
self-organizing systems; (ii) natural states may be conceived as the
stable states of emergent global order produced in such systems.
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For an extra nudge in Aristotle’s direction, one might also add in the
following thought. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle has an account of
organic matter as essentially a dynamic potentiality for generating
biological form. And that is precisely what one gets, if one
understands organic development in terms of a certain sub-class of
self-organizing physical systems.
It may seem that my flagship example of self-organized form
doesn’t line up too well with Aristotelian life-capacities, since while
the latter takes forms to be species-specific, the emergent order in
the phyllotaxis case (spiral phyllotaxis, or even spiral phyllotaxis
with a certain angle of rotation) is seemingly more general, in that
many species may realize the same generic pattern. In fact, we just
need to be rather more subtle in our understanding of Aristotle. As
Lennox points out, for Aristotle, biological kinds are ‘a set of
general differentiae, features common to every bird or fish, qua bird
or fish… Birds, qua birds, have beaks, for example. Different sorts
[species] of birds may have beaks of differing length, width, hue,
hardness, curvature. It is these sorts of differences, throughout all
the differentiae of the general kind, which differentiate one form of
bird from another.’29 Pursuing our parallel, it seems likely, then, that
specific forms—a distinctive sunflower leaf-structure, for example—
may be understood as local variations on more fundamental patterns
of self-organization, variations determined by the ways in which
genes, in particular, act so as to parameterize the self-organizing
dynamics realized by the species of organism in question.30
If Aristotelian natural state thinking in biology has indeed been
successfully resurrected, then Taylor’s biocentric framework for
environmental ethics is also back on the map. Still, the observations
that I have submitted so far, in favour of the view that self-organi-
zation-based developmental biology has Aristotelian credentials are
manifestly the beginning, rather than the end, of a story. I can’t
hope to complete that story here. However, in the next section I
shall attempt to take us part of the way, by clarifying the basic
proposal, and by shoring it up against some prima facie objections. 
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29 J. Lennox, ‘Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in
Aristotle’s Biology’, in his Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 162. 
30 Goodwin is one source for this conceptualization of how genes con-
tribute to development. As he puts it: ‘During reproduction, each species
produces gametes with genes defining parameters that specify what mor-
phogenetic trajectory the zygote will follow’ (op. cit. note 27, 102). For fur-
ther discussion, see M. Wheeler, ‘Do Genes Code for Traits?’ (op. cit. note
28). 
5. Twists, Turns, and where the Road Runs Out
I have argued that the kind of developmental gravitation that must
exist for Aristotelian biology to have any real purchase may be
cashed out in terms of the underlying principles of change that
specify the generic dynamics exhibited by particular developmental
self-organizing systems. I have also suggested that Aristotelian
natural states may be identified with the stable states of emergent
global order produced by such self-organizing systems. But these
claims need attention. As was clear from Goodwin’s explanation of
phyllotaxis, exactly which stable states of emergent global order are
produced during development will typically depend on the values
taken by the parameters of the system and by the initial conditions
that obtain. This qualification might seem to be the population-
biological fly in the natural state ointment. As we know, the natural
state thinker needs it to be the case both that there is a privileged
phenotype (the organismic natural state) and that each organism of
the appropriate kind has a natural tendency to realize that
phenotype. In response the population geneticist argues, with the
apparent backing of mainstream contemporary evolutionary
theory, that biological nature offers only norms of reaction
(genotype-phenotype mappings in particular environments) and
thus that the interlocking conditions required to support natural
state thinking are simply not satisfied in the actual world. Now,
given the way in which the population geneticist appeals here to the
environmental embedding of development, one way of hearing the
natural state thinker’s predicament is that she wishes to specify
what counts as the natural state of an organism (the privileged
phenotype) independently of any developmental environment.
Seemingly in this vein, Sober observes that the ‘natural state model
presupposes that there is some phenotype which is the natural one
that is independent of a choice of environment.’31 If this interpretation
were correct, the attempt to understand self-organization-based
thinking as a rediscovery of the natural state model would be
doomed to failure. For the developmental environment will
typically be the source of some of the parameter values and initial
conditions that will partially control exactly which states of
emergent order will be generated by any particular set of self-
organizing dynamics. Under these circumstances, it might seem
that ‘all’ that the self-organization-based thinker is doing is
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detailing the processes underlying particular norms of reaction; that
is, she is ‘merely’ identifying the mechanisms by which the
transitions from a specific genotype to specific phenotypes are
realized in specific environments. She is not rediscovering
Aristotelianism. And a good thing too, one might think. For if the
Aristotelian theorist really is committed to the claim that the
natural state of an organism is a privileged phenotype in that it may
be specified independently of any developmental environment
(with only deviations from that natural state being traceable to
environmental influence), then she is guilty of radically
misconceiving the relationship between organism and environment.
As population genetics makes clear, every phenotype is a product of
interactions between genetic and environmental factors; so no sense
at all can be given to the idea of an environment-independent
phenotype.
If natural state thinking is to be revived, it needs to free itself
from the troublesome thesis of phenotypic environmental
independence. In this context it is interesting that, in the very next
sentence after Sober states this thesis, he glosses it as follows: the
‘natural state model presupposes that there is some environment
which is the natural environment for the genotype to be in, which
determines, in conjunction with the norm of reaction, what the
natural phenotype for the genotype is.’32 This is not equivalent to
the environmental independence thesis. Indeed, Sober’s putative
gloss changes the picture in a highly significant way. On this new
understanding, the natural state model incorporates environmental
dependence, but makes the identification of a privileged
environment (the natural one) part of the process by which the
natural phenotype is picked out. In other words, all phenotypes are
equal (with respect to environmental dependence), but one is more
equal than others.  
So how is this first-among-equals position to be secured? One
option that suggests itself is to observe that some developmental
environments will be statistically more common than others, and to
claim that by virtue of their sheer numerical pervasiveness, the
more common environments ought to count as the natural ones. But
we have already rejected mere statistical prevalence as failing to
secure the kind of constrained developmental profile that the
natural state model requires. Another, seemingly more promising
approach, is to hoist the fan of population genetics by her own
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petard, and to appeal directly to Darwinian theory. The idea here is
to exploit the concept (often used in adaptationist evolutionary psy-
chology) of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (or EEA) of
a phenotypic trait.33 Roughly, the EEA of a phenotypic trait is the
historical environment to which that trait is adapted, the
environment within which its fitness enhancing effects resulted in it
being selected for within the population. Statistically speaking, the
EEA need not be the most common historical environment.
Moreover, as long as the organism in question remains viable,
adapted traits may hang around long after their historically present
fitness-enhancing effects have been neutralized by environmental
change. (The persistence of the human sweet tooth in an
environment rich with refined sugar is a nice example.) 
The present suggestion results in a more complicated strategy
than Sober’s passing reference to a privileged developmental
environment suggests, although the core idea remains the same.
The natural phenotypic form is now relativized not to a single
environment, but rather to a set of historical environments, each of
which is the EEA of one or more of the relevant phenotypic traits.
Other extant environments may result in different phenotypic
forms being generated (if, for example, different environmental
factors result in different parameters for the developmental self-
organizing system). Nevertheless, we certainly seem to have a
handle on the idea of a privileged (natural) environment, and thus,
despite the environmental dependence of development, on the idea
of a privileged (natural) phenotype.
In spite of any off-the-shelf, tried-and tested attractiveness that
this proposal might seem to have, I’m afraid that it is far from
unproblematic as a way of salvaging Aristotelian natural state
thinking. One worry that, in the end, has only limited bite turns on
the fact that Aristotle characterized biological modes of
organization as internal to the entities concerned. In other words,
the modes of organization in which we are interested, for the
purposes of biological explanation, are not externally imposed upon
biological systems, but rather are essential aspects of the intrinsic
natures of those systems.34 This feature of Aristotle’s account is
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Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, M. C. Nussbaum and A. Oksenberg Rorty
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difficult to square with the tabled appeal to Darwinian selection—
difficult, but not impossible. The problem, on the face of it, is that,
given a certain neo-Darwinian outlook that characterizes evolution
as a process of random genetic mutation plus environmentally
driven gene-sifting, the appeal to selection seems to shift the source
of biological form away from the organism and towards the
environment (of evolutionary adaptedness), the external location of
the relevant selection pressures. This looks to be incompatible with
Aristotelian ‘internalism’. 
Fortunately the tension here can be relieved. First we need to
remind ourselves of the rich, organism-centred processes of
developmental self-organization that we are now taking to mediate
the genotype-to-phenotype mapping. Second we need to adopt a
certain interpretation of what Aristotle meant by ‘internal’. Given
that we are rejecting the problematic thesis of phenotypic environ-
mental independence, it seems we are free to read ‘internal’ as
‘autonomous’, in the sense introduced earlier, that is as indicating (i)
that the global behaviour of the system in question is not being
organized by some (inner or outer) controlling executive that
dictates or orchestrates the activity of the individual components,
and (ii) that those individual components do not make their
contributions by accessing and following some comprehensive plan
of the global behaviour, but rather by following purely local
principles of causal interaction. Finally we need to characterize the
influence of the environment on the organismic dynamics here in
the right way. Fans of developmental self-organization often speak
of factors that affect the behaviour of some system without
themselves being affected not merely as setting parameters of the
system, but as setting control parameters. In this term of art, the
word ‘control’ is being used not to signal a process in which the
states of the other elements of the system are specified directly by
the value of the control parameter, or in which the control
parameter ‘instructs’ those other elements as to how they should
change. The idea, rather, is that variations in the values of a control
parameter may have the effect of transforming the way in which the
target system is changing over time.35 This notion of a substantial
influence on the underlying dynamics of the target system is fully
compatible with the claim that the processes that are
fundamentally responsible for the generation of biological form are
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organism-internal, if, that is, ‘internal’ is read as ‘autonomous’ in
the way that I have suggested. Thus we can have the cake of
appealing to the concept of an environment of evolutionary
adaptedness, while happily consuming a notion of biological form
in which such forms are robustly traceable to organism-centred
processes.
Here is a more serious worry about the compatibility of our
emerging neo-Aristotelian framework with the suggested appeal to
selection. The fact is that, under certain circumstances, selection
and self-organization may pull phenotypes in different directions.
The seminal exploration of this possibility is due to Stuart
Kauffman.36 An example from Burian and Richardson’s discussion
of Kauffman’s work will help to focus the issue.37 Assume that the
generic order of a particular self-organizing system under
evolutionary influence is to be blue, but that selection favours red.
After many generations of evolution, will blue persist in the
population, even though it is being selected against, and to what
extent will it be visible? Kauffman’s work suggests that, given
certain conditions, the answer is that blue (the generic order) will be
common, even in the face of strong selection in favour of red.
Let’s be more specific. At the heart of Kauffman’s work is a
formal tool for biological investigation known as the NK model. If
we adopt an interpretation of the NK model such that the
parameter N is the number of genes in each genotype, and the
parameter K is the degree of epistasis, then, as K increases, the
fitness landscape becomes increasingly random, such that the
fitness values of genotypic neighbours are uncorrelated. Since
evolution by mutation and selection will be unlikely to find global
optima in this random space, sub-optimal generic forms will persist.
If K is low, then the fitness landscape will be smooth and gradual,
but may have very shallow inclines (if N is high), in which case only
small fitness differences will be available for selection to exploit, or
very steep inclines (if N is low), in which case small mutations will
tend to have relatively large disruptive effects. In either case, one
cannot expect to find populations converged at the fitness peaks,
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and sub-optimal generic forms will survive. The upshot is that, for
a wide range of parameter values, the results of self-organization
rather than those of selection will be dominant.
Now notice that our strong inclination, in describing this result,
is to say that because of the power of endogenously driven self-
organization, a natural biological form has persisted in the face of a
strong selection pressure against it. On the plus side (for the neo-
Aristotelian), this means that the idea of the wellsprings of
biological form being autonomous and organism-centred (‘internal’
in Aristotle’s terms) rewards a more straightforward interpretation
that it has hitherto enjoyed. But there is a significant cost. First note
that in Kauffman’s mathematical model the only environmental
factor is the selection pressure against the pre-specified generic
order. In real organismic development, however, there will, as we
have seen, be a range of additional environmentally determined
parameters that will have an influence on exactly which phenotypic
outcome results. To preserve a vanilla version of Kauffman’s
scenario these influences will need to be selectively neutral.
Nevertheless, for the reasons that we have explored previously, the
natural state model needs to take them into account. And our
preferred strategy for identifying the natural phenotype in the midst
of such environment-relative variation has been to single out that
phenotype by way of the privileged developmental environment
that is the EEA. In the Kauffman scenario, however, there is no
EEA, since adaptation has not taken place. So that strategy doesn’t
even get a foothold. In short, if the results of the NK model are
robust, and if analogues of Kauffman’s theoretical evolutionary
scenario are widespread in nature, then we cannot adopt a general
strategy of identifying the natural phenotype by way of an EEA. 
Of course there are some big empirical ifs here. For example,
Harvey and Bossomaier have focused on a key assumption of
Kauffman’s NK model, namely that update is synchronous. They
show that if this assumption is relaxed, then very different systemic
behaviour ensues, behaviour that would cast doubt on the idea that
Kauffman’s conclusions about selection and self-organization could
be generalized to asynchronous systems.38 This result is potentially
telling since, as Harvey and Bossomaier themselves observe, one
might expect many biological systems to be asynchronous in
character. Perhaps then there is, after all, light at the end of the
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tunnel for the strategy of identifying natural phenotypes by way of
EEAs, and thus for a reconstructed 21st century version of the
Aristotelian natural state model in biology. 
6. Conclusion: the Prospects for an Aristotelian
Environmental Ethics  
It’s been a while since environmental ethics occupied the
foreground in this paper, so it is time to draw together the threads
of what we have learned into something approaching a take-home
message for that particular area of philosophical inquiry, delivered
courtesy of philosophy of biology. It seems that environmental
ethics, by its very nature, is going to be more attracted to a
biological grounding for ethics than some of its philosophical near-
neighbours. Of course, basing one’s ethics on biological science—
any kind of biological science—is always going to be a hazardous
business fraught with dangers relating to exactly how that science
and the conceptual theorizing that surrounds it will turn out; but
that’s life, at least for the naturalistically inclined. If I’m right, the
biocentric environmental-ethical framework developed by Taylor is
positioned precariously at a crossroads in biological theory. For, as
we have seen, that framework depends on the Aristotelian natural
state model of biological systems, a model that stands in a complex
relationship with (a) Darwinian population biology and (b) the
interface between self-organization-driven accounts of organismic
development and mainstream evolutionary thinking about the
power and ubiquity of Darwinian selection. The prospects for bio-
centric individualism of Taylor’s stripe (and for any other environ-
mental-ethical accounts that share its character) are contingent
upon the outcomes of those debates. Faced with such uncertainty,
the wiliest of environmental ethicists may ultimately decide (or may
have decided already) to resist the charms of an evolutionary
grounding in favour of some other philosophical underpinning.
Given the acute and pressing nature of the world’s environmental
problems, that’s what I would do.39
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